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This study examines how widespread the similarities between U.S. and Japanese corporate go-
vernance practices have become. Results suggest that, in spite of convergence in many areas of 
business practices, Japanese board structures and governance practices still differ greatly from 
those in the United States – particularly in SEC-mandated reforms such as independent audit and 
compensation committees. Our results suggest that findings concerning corporate governance 
differences between Japanese and U.S. firms may be driven, in part, by differences in directors’ 
recognition of investors’ performance expectations. In particular, our results indicate that the exit 
barriers related to employment impact decision-making for Japanese directors more strongly than 
they affect U.S. directors’ decisions.   
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COMPARING JAPANESE VERSUS U.S. DECISION MAKING IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
Waning investor confidence in the performance of Japanese corporations has motivated 
some Japanese firms to embrace corporate governance structures and practices that resemble 
U.S. board reforms. Western-style CEOs, like Howard Stringer at Sony or Carlos Ghosn at Nis-
san Motors, were recruited to restructure Japanese firms and introduce western governance prac-
tices to improve company performance. But how much progress has actually been made towards 
the convergence of corporate governance policies in Japan and the United States? Where are 
publicly-traded firms in each respective country most similar to each other in their governance 
practices and outlooks and is convergence necessarily desirable?   
 
Ahmadjian & Robbins (2005) argue that the increasing pressure of Japanese shareholder 
capitalism has made some Japanese managers and corporate boards accept downsizing, divesti-
ture, and other corporate strategy practices that are more characteristic of western-style corporate 
governance.  Does this mean that Japanese board members use performance measures and deci-
sion criteria that are similar to U.S. board members, as well?  Milhaupt (2001) argues that Japa-
nese social norms opposing downsizing practices do not have a long history and that opposition 
to them is waning in light of the rise of shareholder-centered ideology in Japan. Pease, et al 
(2006) suggest that greater turnover among Japanese shareholders may result in more corporate 
governance practices reflecting this change. Since there are conflicting perceptions of how far 
Japanese corporate governance reform has progressed, this study examines how widespread the 
similarities between U.S. and Japanese corporate governance practices have become – particular-
ly with respect to downsizings and the treatment of distressed lines of business. 
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Results suggest that in spite of convergence in many areas of business practices, Japanese 
board structures and governance practices still differ greatly from those in the United States 
where corporate boards have undergone substantial reforms to regain the confidence of Ameri-
can investors in a post-scandal era. Wu (2004) notes that public opinion has compelled the direc-
tors of U.S. firms to improve their corporate governance systems. Most notably, the financial re-
porting requirements of Sabanes-Oxley legislation and process of 404 internal controls certifica-
tion have strengthened corporate governance structures and practices in the United States -- mak-
ing independent audit committees stronger than they were in the era of Enron- and Tyco-related 
control scandals and making independent compensation committees more cautious about exces-
sive pay schemes in the U.S. In spite of investor concerns about similar Japanese accounting 
scandals, our results indicate that reforms such as independent audit and compensation commit-
tees are not yet as widespread among Japanese boards as they are among U.S. boards. 
 
The rigorous corporate governance policies imposed in the United States by the oversight 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are a mixed blessing because – although 
shareholders can credibly rely on these reforms to expect that troubled businesses will be dealt 
with efficiently – the corporate managers who implement divestitures are heavily evaluated by 
expectations of shareholder value maximization in the United States. Their corporate boards are 
more willing to sell troubled U.S. businesses to owners that can obtain better performances from 
them. Managers typically expect their troubled lines of business to be divested to new owners (or 
liquidated) if their respective turnarounds are not achieved promptly. Our results suggest that 
findings concerning corporate governance differences between Japanese and U.S. firms may be 
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driven, in part, by differences in directors’ recognition of investors’ performance expectations 
(Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Gugler et al, 2004). Against a backdrop of strongly rising share-
holder capitalism, financial considerations shape an increasing number of corporate directors’ 
perceptions concerning what constitutes attractive investment opportunities and which business-
es to retain in the corporate family. Pressures to divest unprofitable lines of business now tend to 
overcome most barriers that could discourage exit decisions. 
 
Earlier studies of divestiture found that timely disposals of assets were impeded where 
exit barriers were perceived to be high by corporate directors and managers (Harrigan, 1981; 
1982). Because exit barriers adversely shaped directors’ perceptions concerning the ease of di-
vesting underperforming assets (Porter, 1976), high exit barriers kept firms operating within 
troubled industries even where they earned subnormal returns on their investments. Our results 
indicate that such exit barriers have largely lost their power over U.S. managers and directors in 
many situations.  Results also suggest that exit barriers related to maintaining employment levels 
influence Japanese directors more strongly than they affect U.S. directors when contemplating 




 We created a 5-point Likert scale questionnaire in order to gather information about Jap-
anese and U.S. firms’ governance structures and perceptions of how to deal with their underper-
forming assets. The questionnaire was translated into Japanese by a native-born colleague. A pa-
rallel sample of publicly-traded firms in Japan and the United States was created to represent 
several industries from each nation’s economy. As Table 1 indicates, industry classifications 
from each source of firm listings were not directly comparable. 
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-------- 
Table 1 about here 
-------- 
 The Japanese questionnaire was mailed to the Presidents of 412 Japanese corporations 
with annual revenues in excess of ¥1 billion.  Many of the sample firms appear in the Nihon Kei-
zai Shimbun.  General machinery firms comprised 10.6% of the Japanese firms queried, electric 
machinery firms comprised 9.6% of the Japanese sample, and chemical firms represented the 
third-largest industry concentration (8.8% of Japanese sample).  Usable responses were received 
from 45 Japanese firms representing 16 different industry classifications (an 11% response rate). 
As Table 2 illustrates, general machinery firms comprised 8.9% of the Japanese responses, as did 
electric machinery firms.   
   
The U.S. questionnaire was mailed to the Chief Executive Officers of 869 United States 
corporations with market capitalizations in excess of US$1 billion. 87 primary industry classifi-
cations were represented in the U.S. mailing.  Retailing firms comprised 9.5% of the U.S. firms 
queried. Insurance and oil and gas were the industries next most highly represented (each com-
prising 8.0% of the total sample). Sample firms’ headquarters were located in 41 different states, 
although 59.8% of the U.S. sample was headquartered in 9 states and California alone comprised 
15.8% of the U.S. mailing to firms. No questionnaires were sent to firms in either country that 
operated primarily in the following industries: investment services, miscellaneous financial ser-
vices, money center banks, regional banks, savings & loans, savings banks, and utilities.  
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-------- 
Table 2 about here 
-------- 
As Table 2 indicates, usable responses were received from 72 U.S. firms representing 40 
different primary industry classifications (a 10.4% response rate). Insurance firms comprised 
7.0% of the U.S. respondents. The next three most highly-represented industries were biotech-
nology, printing and publishing, and scientific and technical instrumentation (each comprising 
5.6% of the responding firms).  Responses were received from firms in 27 states. 11.4% of the 
U.S. responses came from Texas; the second largest number of responses (7.1% each) came from 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois.  
 
 A Chi-square analysis was performed on the two samples – Japanese and U.S. -- to test 
the hypothesis that the populations are the same. Where results differed significantly, the domi-
nant response – agree or disagree – is reported.  Although many totals are reported as sums of the 
dominant responses – agree/ strongly agree (or disagree/ strongly disagree, respectively) -- 
strongly-expressed responses are discussed separately where they are noteworthy. Scores are not 
reported for responses located at the middle of the Likert scale – for the category of “neither 




 Results are reported concerning differences between the samples in director indepen-
dence, board committees, directors’ performance expectations, and their perceptions of exit bar-
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Differences in board structure and independence 
 
Board independence has been cited as being important to the creation of shareholder val-
ue (Cotter et al, 1997).  Wagner, et al (1998) found a curvilinear relationship in which having 
mostly insiders (or mostly outsiders) contributed positively to firm performance. We phrased our 
questions about the proportion of insiders versus outsiders on a company board in terms of their 
respective independence. 
 
In our study, results concerning director “independence” are significantly different for 
our two samples -- perhaps because we used a stringent definition of it (that is consistent with the 
SEC’s definition of independence). As Table 3 indicates, independence was defined in our sur-
vey such that directors are not (nor have they been) employees of the firm, represent neither sup-
plier nor customer firms, and have no relatives holding key managerial positions within the firm 
nor other financial ties with it (other than shareholdings). 90.3% of the U.S. respondents agreed 
with the statement; all of the Japanese respondents disagreed with the statement (χ2=100.44****). 
This result may seem surprising because results from Kaplan & Minton (1994) suggested that 
independent outsiders are being appointed with increasing frequency to Japanese boards to moni-
tor firms’ performance. But outsider directors on many Japanese boards that are acting as repre-
sentatives of the firm’s corporate and banking institutional investors are scarcely independent 
(Yoshikawa & Phan, 2005). Since the Nihon Keizai Shimbun sample was expected to be repre-
sentative of the full range of Japanese firms, additional questions probed the issue of director in-
dependence. 
-------- 
Table 3 about here 
-------- 
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Japanese responses differed from U.S. responses about the composition of their boards 
with respect to the appointment of insiders. As Table 4 indicates, in a question suggesting that 
few insiders served on the board of directors of their company, no Japanese respondents agreed 
with the statement and 84.7% of the U.S. sample agreed with it (χ2=79.94****). Given our earlier 
definition of independence, the U.S. sample showed some overestimation bias in their responses 
when Table 3 is compared with Table 4. Responses from the Japanese sample reflect the reality 
that most Japanese directors have worked for the same company as employees and worked their 
way up before being appointed as directors (Cooke & Sawa, 1998). 
-------- 
Table 4 about here 
-------- 
We next asked a normative question that stated that the only corporate officer serving on 
a firm’s board of directors should be its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) – an opinion that is con-
sistent with guidelines offered by the North American Association of Corporate Directors 
(NACD), a self-governing group of professional directors (NACD, 2002). As Table 5 reveals, 
only 48.6% of the U.S. respondents agreed with this normative statement, as compared with 
22.0% of the Japanese respondents (χ2=37.80****). 36.1% of the U.S. respondents disagreed with 
the normative statement about limiting insiders’ board membership as compared with 58.3% of 
the Japanese respondents. Since Japanese board members are viewed as de facto managers who 
are subordinate to their CEO, the high proportion of disagreement among the Japanese responses 
is easy to interpret (Yoshikawa & Phan, 2005).  NACD-proposed reforms have not yet reached 
many Japanese boardrooms. 
-------- 
Table 5 about here 
-------- 
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Since insiders serving on a corporate board could include vice chairpersons, presidents of 
operating subsidiaries, and the current Chief Financial Officer (CFO), among others, we asked a 
clarifying question to distinguish between active corporate officers versus retired ones that may 
serve on a firm’s board.  In the normative statement that no retired officers of the company 
should serve on its board of directors after their retirements, only 18.1% of the Japanese respon-
dents agreed (as compared with 46.5% of the U.S. respondents). 52.3% of the Japanese managers 
(and 33.8% of the U.S. managers) disagreed with this normative statement (χ2=21.94***). The 
Japanese responses to the question concerning the presence of retired corporate officers on com-
pany boards are consistent with Miwa & Ramseyer’s (2005) findings that independent outside 
directors are most likely to serve on boards of Japanese firms in a very limited set of industries 
that may not be represented by this sample. They are not consistent with Peng’s (2004) observa-
tions about outsiders serving on corporate boards nor with Yafeh’s (2000) predictions of conver-
gence. Yoshikawa & Phan (2005) would assert that the executives and former employees of Jap-
anese corporate boards do not consider themselves as active monitors of top management. 
 
-------- 
Table 6 about here 
-------- 
In a survey item stating that director independence ensured that the company’s board of 
directors would be constructively critical of managerial performance, 83.1% of the U.S. respon-
dents agreed with the statement (compared with 22.7% of the Japanese respondents). As Table 7 
indicates, 15.9% of the Japanese respondents disagreed with the statement and 52.3% of them 
strongly disagreed (χ2=64.85****), suggesting that director independence is not yet valued on Jap-
anese boards. Since Klein (1998) found significant positive correlations between firm perfor-
mance and the number of corporate officers on finance and investment committees, we inter-
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preted our result as suggesting that respondents in the Japanese sample believed that having in-
sider directors on their boards provides valuable information to other board members about their 
firm’s long-term investment decisions.  Moreover, as Yoshikawa & Phan (2005) point out, typi-
cal Japanese directors do not question executive management and do not delegate their mana-
gerial duties to corporate officers. 
-------- 
Table 7 about here 
-------- 
Differences in committee structure and independence: Audit committees 
 
 Questions about committee structures followed the NACD’s Blue Ribbon Committee’ 
guidelines concerning board structures. Our results indicated independence differences between 
Japanese and U.S. boards in the composition of their committees. As Table 8 shows, in this 
study, 90.3% of the U.S. sample strongly agreed with the statement that their firm’s audit com-
mittee was independent. (All of the Japanese respondents disagreed with this statement, 
χ2=111.96****). Audit committee independence is one of the non-negotiable board attributes 
mandated by SEC reforms and publicly-traded U.S. firms are castigated for failing to satisfy this 
structural requirement (NACD, 2002). In Japan, it has been proposed that at least half of the au-
dit committee members must be outside directors who cannot serve as executive officers of the 
company (Takehara & Nihei, 2005), but it is not known how many firms have embraced this 
recommendation for reform. 
-------- 
Table 8 about here 
-------- 
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Agrawal & Chadha (2005) found that independent directors with financial expertise are 
valuable in providing oversight of a firm’s accounting practices. In a question suggesting that all 
of the members of a firm’s audit committee were financially literate -- i.e., each member fulfilled 
the minimum regulatory requirements concerning the comprehension and use of financial state-
ments (Report of the NACD, 2004) -- 75% of the U.S. respondents strongly agreed with the 
statement, but 86.4% of the Japanese respondents disagreed with this statement (χ2=91.4%****). 
The results – shown in Table 9 – are unexpected, given the abundance of tutorial courses con-
cerning interpretation of financial statements that are offered in the United States to professional 
directors. It suggests that in the selection of Japanese directors, financial literacy is valued less 
highly than in the case of U.S. boards. Cooke & Sawa (1998) report that some Japanese compa-
nies have corporate auditors – which are separate from accounting auditors – who are often ap-
pointed from the firm’s employee ranks with no particular financial qualifications.  
-------- 
Table 9 about here 
-------- 
Responses to the question about the power of corporate audit committees provided another indi-
cation that corporate governance reforms like Sarbanes-Oxley legislation have not yet trans-
formed all Japanese board structures. Table 10 indicates that there was some disagreement be-
tween the samples with respect to the statement that the firm’s audit committee hires and fires 
the independent audit firm and receives the audit firm’s reports concerning the accuracy of per-
formance data to be released by the company to investors. 88.9% of the U.S. respondents strong-
ly agreed with the statement that their audit committee hired audit firms and received their re-
ports. Two-thirds (69.8%) of the Japanese respondents agreed with the statement.  Only 25.6% of 
the Japanese respondents disagreed with this description of the audit committee’s powers 
(χ2=43.02****). We concluded that although Japanese audit committees possess similar powers 
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vis-à-vis interactions with independent audit firms, expectations concerning their oversight activ-
ities differ from those of U.S. audit committees.  In particular, Japanese audit committee mem-
bers are not yet placed in jeopardy by their failure to recognize and act upon internal control gaps 
that may elude detection by outside accounting audit firms.  The combination of less jeopardy 
disciplining a statutory audit committee that is not really independent is a recipe for lax controls. 
-------- 
Table 10 about here 
-------- 
 
Differences in committee structure and independence: Compensation committees 
 
  Questions about the composition and role of the board’s compensation committee fol-
lowed the NACD’s guidelines concerning the setting of executive compensation (Report of the 
NACD, 2007).  In Table 11, 97.2% of the U.S. respondents agreed that their board had an “inde-
pendent” compensation committee as is required by the SEC (using the same stringent, SEC-
inspired language as was used in the questions concerning the firm’s audit committee members).  
72.7% of the Japanese respondents disagreed with the statement that their board’s compensation 
committee was independent (χ2=82.81****), which is consistent with the Japanese principle of 
internalism whereby companies are controlled by internally-appointed board members (Bucha-
nan, 2007). Internalism means that Japanese shareholders accept management’s recommenda-
tions on most governance matters and proxy fights where shareholders reject managerial deci-
sions are rare – even after the proposed takeover of Tokyo Kohtetsu was defeated in 2007 
(Morse & Moffett, 2007). Takehara & Nihei (2005) define an outside director as a non-managing 
director who does not, and never did, manage the corporate affairs of the company or one of its 
subsidiaries as a director, executive officer, manager or other employee and who is not an em-
ployee of the company or one of its subsidiaries. The 2005 report of the Corporate Governance 
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Forum of Japan recommends that at least half of the firm’s compensation committee must be 
outside directors – assuming that the Japanese firm has committees (instead of corporate auditors 
as overseers).  There are no restrictions about outside directors in Japan representing supplier or 
customer firms, having relatives holding key managerial positions within the firm, or having oth-
er financial ties with it (other than shareholdings) in these recommendations. 
-------- 
Table 11 about here 
-------- 
U.S. boards are often criticized when executive salaries rise to unwarranted levels, but 
most of their compensation committees retain consultants only to establish CEO salaries. When 
asked whether their board’s compensation committee acted in this manner -- setting only their 
CEO’s salary, while ratifying salary recommendations for other officers -- 98.6% of the U.S. 
respondents agreed with the statement, as Table 12 indicates.  Although more than half of the 
Japanese sample agreed with the U.S. respondents concerning this aspect of compensation com-
mittee activity, the populations are still statistically different in the distribution of their res-
ponses.  In Table 12, 54.5% of the Japanese presidents agreed with the statement while 27.8% 
did not (χ2=78.44****). When combined with earlier responses from the Japanese sample, the res-
ponses shown in Table 12 suggest that, in Japanese firms, the board’s compensation committee is 
-- in effect -- making recommendations on their own compensation packages by rubber-stamping 
the CEO’s salary recommendations. 
-------- 
Table 12 about here 
-------- 
 In summary, results indicate that some Japanese and U.S. boards have compensation 
committees as well as audit committees.  The committees of U.S. boards are more independent 
than their Japanese counterparts. Independent outsiders are more likely to serve on U.S. boards 
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than on Japanese ones, and director independence is valued more highly by U.S. boards than 
Japanese ones (where we infer that internalism is more highly valued). Retired corporate execu-
tives and current corporate officers other than the CEO are more likely to serve on Japanese 
boards than on U.S. ones. U.S. audit committees are more likely to contain finance experts and 
financially-literate directors than are Japanese ones. 
  
Given that results indicated that their board compositions are different with respect to in-
dependence, we wondered whether board decisions concerning performance would also differ 
between the U.S. and Japanese samples.  Do differences in board and committee composition 
explain differences in how corporate decisions such as exit and divestiture are regarded?  To ex-
plore this relationship, our questionnaire posed several questions about the board’s role in deci-
sion making and how the board evaluates their firm’s performance.  
 
Board involvement in and evaluation of corporate decisions: Performance expectations 
 
Responses from the two samples disagreed slightly regarding their reaction to the state-
ment that their company’s board of directors should not be actively involved in its day-to-day 
operations. 16.0% of the Japanese respondents and 5.6% of the U.S. respondents disagreed with 
this statement (χ2=16.32**). In particular, As Table 13 indicates, 57.8% of the U.S. respondents 
strongly agreed with the idea of a hands-off board of directors that represents shareholder inter-
ests, but whose intervention into daily operations is limited to hiring and firing the firm’s CEO. 
By contrast, if Japanese corporate managers and directors are indeed the same individuals, the 
lines of control and intervention could become more easily blurred  -- particularly if no delega-
tion of duties to executive officers occurs (Hirota & Kawamura, 2007).  
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-------- 
Table 13 about here 
-------- 
 The responses of the Japanese sample showed lower expectations that the board empha-
sized shareholder primacy in their decisions -- a contrast, perhaps, of the stakeholder- versus 
stockholder-oriented models (Abe & Shimizutani, 2007). Table 14 shows the pattern of res-
ponses to a statement that the firm’s board of directors primarily represents its shareholders’ in-
terests and concerns by ensuring that the firm’s activities all create value. For this statement, res-
ponses the U.S. sample largely agreed (87.2%). The dominant answer in the Japanese sample 
was disagreement with the statement (51.2%). Results suggested that the samples differed signif-
icantly concerning whether they perceived that their firm’s board of directors primarily 
represents its shareholders’ interests and concerns by ensuring that the firm’s activities all create 
value (χ2=55.72****), with the Japanese sample apparently tolerating more deviations in the re-
turns realized from their firm’s investment activities. 
-------- 
Table 14 about here 
-------- 
Japanese responses differed from U.S. responses concerning how the boards perceived at-
tainment of their goals. In a statement suggesting that their firm’s performance was evaluated 
primarily through increases in its stock price and dividend payments to investors, 81% of the 
Japanese respondents agreed with the statement.  This result is surprising, given Kato & Kubo’s 
(2006) finding that stock market performance plays a lesser role in compensating Japanese man-
agers. As Table 15 indicates, responses from U.S. respondents were equally split between 
agreement and disagreement, suggesting a significant difference in dividend policies, informa-
tion exchange within stock markets, and how performance is evaluated by top management and 
corporate boards in each respective country (χ2=27.97****).  In the United States, board members 
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and managers recognize the destabilizing impact of public information, rumors and day traders 
on fluctuations in a firm’s stock price (Bushman, et al, 2006).  U.S. value creation for institution-
al shareholders occurs as much by the issuance of large special dividends to return capital from 
operations of mature industries as it does by stock price increases enjoyed by firms operating 
within riskier, growth industries. 
-------- 
Table 15 about here 
-------- 
 
 The Japanese and U.S. samples were dissimilar in their responses concerning the use of 
revenue-growth forecasts and the length of time required to pay back their investments (“pay-
back”) as primary criteria for evaluating attractive investment opportunities. As Table 16 indi-
cates, 54.2% of the U.S. respondents agreed that their firm’s investments in new lines of business 
were evaluated primarily on the basis of revenue growth and payback, compared with 29.5% of 
the Japanese respondents (χ2=11.62*). In the Japanese sample, 33.1% of the respondents disa-
greed with these metrics being the primary criteria for evaluating new lines of business, which 
suggests that the traditional strategic performance measures of return on investment and return 
on sales may be weighted more heavily in Japanese boards’ evaluations of new lines of business 
(Banker, et al, 1996). 
-------- 
Table 16 about here 
-------- 
Posing a question about the measure most typically used by investment bankers to value 
firms, we found similarity between the distributions of responses for the two samples. In Table 
17, 56.3% of the U.S. respondents agreed that the future value of their firm was evaluated pri-
marily in terms of the firm’s revenue growth and outlook for industry-wide profit margins while 
21.2% disagreed, as compared with 40.9% of the Japanese respondents who agreed while 36.4% 
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disagreed (χ2=3.91, which is not statistically significant). Apparently some (but not all) of the 
board members in both countries are aware of the calculation of enterprise value, keep their 
firm’s current valuation in mind when making decisions concerning their firm’s lines of busi-
ness, and strive to make decisions that realize the firm’s corporate value (Whittaker & Hayaka-
wa, 2007).  The survey statement did not seek concurrence about what constitutes an attractive 
line of business within the corporation. 
-------- 
Table 17 about here 
-------- 
Finally we asked about the importance of maintaining stable levels of employment as a 
metric for evaluating the attractiveness of their firm’s lines of business.  In Table 18, 33.3% of 
the Japanese respondents agreed that attractiveness as an investment was evaluated primarily in 
terms of its success at maintaining stable employment (compared with only 4.4% of the U.S. res-
pondents), while 52.4% of the Japanese respondents disagreed with the statement (compared 
with 84.1% of the U.S. respondents). In Japan, the frequent adjustment of employment during 
the negative phase of business cycles has been regarded as an irresponsible transfer of business 
risks to employees (Suzuki, 1999). Results suggest that greater concerns exist among the Japa-
nese respondents in maintaining stable employment (χ2=22.18***) and the distributions of these 
responses were in the directions that are consistent with our expectations concerning the impact 




Table 18 about here 
-------- 
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 Results indicate that boards are not expected to intervene in day-to-day operations in nei-
ther Japan nor the United States. Shareholders’ interests and concerns weigh heavily in evalua-
tions of business activities within U.S. boards of directors. Rises in stock prices and dividend 
payments are weighted more heavily within Japanese boards when evaluating their firms’ per-
formance. Payback and expectations of revenue growth are weighted more heavily when U.S. 
boards evaluate investments. Boards of directors in both Japan and the United States acknowl-
edge that revenue growth and industry attractiveness will determine their firm’s future value.  
Japanese boards consider stable employment substantially more important than U.S. boards do 
when evaluating a firm’s attractiveness.  Given these criteria, we wondered how Japanese and 
U.S. boards coped with underperforming lines of business within their respective firms. Were 
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Exit barriers and divestitures 
 
If the decisions of corporate directors can affect their firms’ performance, we would ex-
pect boards to support divestiture when restructuring efforts are not successful. In our survey, the 
two samples responded very differently to a statement suggesting that their firm’s board of direc-
tors would divest under-performing lines of business that cannot be turned around successfully in 
order to meet performance targets (χ2=61.44****). The Japanese responses were dramatically bi-
modal; 56.1% of the Japanese responses strongly disagreed with this statement, but 29.3% of the 
Japanese responses strongly agreed with it. The U.S. responses to this question were bunched in 
the middle of the Likert scale, with a total of 19.7% disagreeing with the statement while 43.7% 
of the U.S. respondents agreed with it. These results support findings that, although downsizings 
in Japan have become more widespread, many Japanese firms are still resistant to them (Ahmad-
jian & Robinson, 2001). Indeed, Kang & Shivdasani (1997) reported that when they experience a 
decline in performance, Japanese firms are less likely to downsize or terminate the employment 
of a large fraction of their workforce.  
-------- 
Table 19 about here 
-------- 
  The samples also differed in their perception of exit barriers associated with showing ac-
counting losses on disposal of a line of business (χ2=42.73****). As Table 20 indicates, write-off 
losses are not perceived as an exit barrier for the boards of most of the U.S. firms in our sample 
(82.8%). In the Japanese sample, 23.3% of the responses suggested that their firm would not get 
out of an unprofitable line of business if a troubled unit were divested until the firm had recov-
ered its investment. (51.2% of the Japanese responses were neutral.) The U.S. sample indicated a 
stronger willingness to exit from unprofitable businesses before reaching their payback level of 
returns.  
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-------- 
Table 20 about here 
-------- 
 Strategic exit barriers associated with market share appear to be stronger for directors in 
Japan than in the United States (χ2=27.93****). In our results, Table 21 indicates that, if a troubled 
line of business were unprofitable, 47.7% of the Japanese responses agreed that their firm would 
not get out of it if its market share were large. 63.6% of the U.S. responses disagreed that large 
market share would deter their board from divesting an unprofitable line of business, suggesting 
that market position is not perceived as a strategic exit barrier to them.  
-------- 
Table 21 about here 
-------- 
Employee terminations are not perceived as exit barriers in U.S. firms. Table 22 shows 
that, in a statement suggesting that their firm would not get out of an unprofitable line of busi-
ness if many employees would lose their jobs, 82.1% of the U.S. responses disagreed with the 
statement. Although 37.1% of the Japanese responses also disagreed with the statement (42.9% 
of the Japanese responses were neutral for this question, while 19% of the responses agreed with 
the statement), the samples are statistically different regarding this deterrent (χ2=26.27****). The 
reluctance of Japanese respondents to comment on this source of exit barriers may be indicative 
of the special role that lifetime employment policies play in Japanese society (Gilson & Roe, 
1999), although Jacoby (2005) would argue that the two employment systems are slowly con-
verging in their practices. 
-------- 
Table 22 about here 
-------- 
Our results suggest that a relationship exists between having independent outsiders on 
corporate boards and those boards’ willingness to divest underperforming assets. Results are 
consistent with the Perry & Shivdasani (2005) study of firms facing material declines in perfor-
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mance which noted that firms having a majority of outsiders on their boards were faster to in-
itiate restructurings leading to performance improvements. Perhaps the absence of questioning 




      * Probability < .05 
    ** Probability < .01 
  *** Probability < .001 
**** Probability < .0001 
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Table 1 
Distribution of Samples by Primary Industry 
                                  Japanese Sample             United States Sample 
Industry                             Firms  (%) Received (%) Firms  (%)   Received (%) 
Advertising                                0    0.00 0          0.00      7        0.81   0 0.00            
Aerospace & defense                0    0.00    0          0.00    11        1.27   1 1.39           
Air courier                                 0    0.00    0          0.00      1        0.12      0 0.00        
Airlines                                      0    0.00    0          0.00      4        0.46     0 0.00                    
Apparel & accessories                               0    0.00    0          0.00      5        0.58     0 0.00                    
Appliances & tools                   0    0.00    0          0.00      5        0.58     0 0.00                   
Audio/video equipment            0    0.00    0          0.00      2        0.23    0 0.00                    
Automobiles/trucks_                 0    0.00    0          0.00      5        0.58  0 0.00                    
Automobile/truck parts          0    0.00    0          0.00     10       1.15     2 2.78                    
Beverages--alcoholic               0    0.00    0          0.00       4       0.46     1 1.39                    
Beverages-non-alcoholic          0    0.00    0          0.00       4       0.46    0 0.00                    
Biotechnology/-drugs           0    0.00    0          0.00     52       5.98   3 4.17                   
Broadcasting/cable TV            0    0.00    0          0.00     24       2.76    0 0.00                   
Business services                  0    0.00    0          0.00     19       2.19    4 5.56                   
Capital goods                         0  0.00    0 0.00 21       2.42     2 2.78           
Casinos/ gaming                       0    0.00    0          0.00       8       0.92     0 0.00        
Chemicals                           34    8.79    2          4.44     24       2.77    3 4.17        
Coal                                         0    0.00    0          0.00       4       0.46   1 1.39          
Commerce                          12    3.10    1          2.22       0       0.00    0 0.00           
Communications                     9    2.33    0          0.00     34       3.91  0 0.00  
Computers                0    0.00    0          0.00     40       4.62      3          4.17 
Conglomerates                        0    0.00    0          0.00     14       1.61      2          2.78 
Construction/ agriculture machinery         0    0.00    0          0.00       5       0.58      2          2.78 
Construction materials           0    0.00    0          0.00       5       0.58      1          1.39 
Construction services            27    6.98    0          0.00     14       1.61      0          0.00  
Containers/ packaging           0    0.00    0          0.00       9       1.04      2          2.78  
Electric machinery             37    9.56    4          8.89       0       0.00      0          0.00             
Electronic components             1    0.26    0          0.00     29       3.34      0          0.00   
Electronic instruments              0    0.00    0          0.00       0       0.00      0          0.00                     
Finance                                20    5.17    3          6.67      13      1.50      1          1.39     
Fishery & farming                    5    1.29    0          0.00        1      0.12      0          0.00                        
Food processing                  20    5.17    3          6.67      25      2.88      1          1.39  
Footwear                0    0.00    0          0.00        3      0.35      0          0.00                     
Forestry and wood                    0    0.00    0          0.00        3      0.35      0          0.00    
Furniture/ fixtures                     0    0.00    0          0.00        9      1.04      0          0.00                             
General machinery             41  10.59    4          8.89        0      0.00      0          0.00                            
Glass & ceramics                13    3.36    2          4.44        0      0.00      0          0.00  
Healthcare facilities                  0    0.00    0          0.00        9      1.04      0          0.00                             
Hotels/ motels                         0    0.00    0          0.00        7      0.81      2          2.78                     
Insurance                                2    0.52    0          0.00      69      7.94      5          6.95                             
Iron & steel                           10    2.58    0          0.00        4      0.46      0          0.00  
Jewelry & silverware                0    0.00    0          0.00        2      0.23      0          0.00                             
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Media                                       2    0.52    1          2.22        6      0.69      0          0.00                             
Metal products                          8    2.07    0          0.00        6      0.69      0          0.00                     
Mining                                      5    1.29    0          0.00        3      0.35      0          0.00  
Mobile homes/ RVs                  0    0.00    0          0.00        2      0.23      0          0.00  
Non-apparel textiles               0    0.00    0          0.00        2      0.23      1          1.39                             
Non-ferrous metals             16    4.13    3          6.66        0      0.00      0          0.00 
Office equipment                      0    0.00    0          0.00        4      0.46      0          0.00                     
Office supplies                          0    0.00    0          0.00        3      0.35      0          0.00  
Oil & gas                0    0.00    0          0.00      58      7.94      5          6.95                             
Other products                    12    3.10    1          2.22        6      0.69      0          0.00 
Paper & paper products            0    0.00    0          0.00        9      1.04      1          1.39  
Personal/ household products                    0    0.00    0          0.00      15      1.73      2          2.78                     
Personal services                     0    0.00    0          0.00        6      0.69      1          1.39                             
Pharmaceuticals                 18    4.65    1          2.22        8      0.92      1          1.39  
Photography                              0    0.00    0          0.00        2      0.23      0          0.00                            
Precision machinery              10    2.58    0          0.00        0      0.00      0          0.00 
Printing & publishing             0    0.00    0          0.00       23     2.65      4          5.56                             
Pulp & paper                             4    1.03    0          0.00        0      0.00      0          0.00 
Railroads                                  0    0.00    0          0.00        6      0.69      1          1.39                          
Real estate                                 5    1.29    0          0.00        0      0.00      0          0.00 
Recreational products & services              0    0.00    0          0.00      14      1.61      2          2.78                            
Rental & leasing                0    0.00    0          0.00        3      0.35      0          0.00 
Restaurants                 0    0.00    0          0.00      16      1.84      1          1.39                            
Retailing                                   0    0.00    0          0.00      82      9.48      6          8.34                            
Rubber products                       5    1.29    0          0.00        0      0.00      0          0.00  
Schools/ training                      0    0.00    0          0.00        9      1.04      1          1.39    
Scientific & technical instruments             0   0.00    0           0.00      14      1.61      4          5.56    
Security systems/ service          0    0.00    0          0.00        1       0.12      0          0.00                            
Services                                     9    2.33    0          0.00        0       0.00      0          0.00                            
Software                                   4    1.03    1          2.22      30       3.45      2          2.78                            
Specialized machinery              7    1.81    0          0.00        0       0.00      0          0.00                            
Textiles & apparel                 11    2.84    0          0.00        0       0.00      0          0.00  
Tires                                           0    0.00    0          0.00        2       0.23      0          0.00 
Tobacco                                     0    0.00    0          0.00        4       0.46      0          0.00                            
Transport equipment          25    6.46    2          4.44        0       0.00      0          0.00                            
Transportation services          8    2.07    0          0.00      11       1.27      2          2.78 
Wholesale services                    7    1.81    0          0.00        0       0.00      0          0.00                            
Unknown                              25    0.60  17        37.78        1       0.12      2          2.78                     
Totals                           412 100.00 45      100.00    869   100.00    72      100.00 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Responses by Primary Industry 
                                  Japanese Sample             United States Sample 
Industry                             Firms  (%) Received (%) Firms  (%)   Received (%) 
Aerospace & defense                0    0.00    0          0.00    11        1.27   1 1.39           
Automobiles/trucks_                 0    0.00    0          0.00      5        0.58  0 0.00                    
Automobile/truck parts          0    0.00    0          0.00     10       1.15     2 2.78                    
Beverages--alcoholic               0    0.00    0          0.00       4       0.46     1 1.39                    
Biotechnology & bio-drugs           0    0.00    0          0.00     52       5.98   3 4.17                   
Business services                  0    0.00    0          0.00     19       2.19    4 5.56                   
Capital goods                         0  0.00    0 0.00 21       2.42     2 2.78           
Chemicals                           34    8.79    2          4.44     24       2.77    3 4.17        
Coal                                         0    0.00    0          0.00       4       0.46   1 1.39          
Commerce                          12    3.10    1          2.22       0       0.00    0 0.00           
Computers                0    0.00    0          0.00     40       4.62      3          4.17 
Conglomerates                        0    0.00    0          0.00     14       1.61      2          2.78 
Construction & agriculture machinery      0    0.00    0          0.00       5       0.58      2          2.78 
Construction materials           0    0.00    0          0.00       5       0.58      1          1.39 
Construction services            27    6.98    0          0.00     14       1.61      0          0.00  
Containers/ packaging           0    0.00    0          0.00       9       1.04      2          2.78  
Electric machinery             37    9.56    4          8.89       0       0.00      0          0.00             
Finance                                20    5.17    3          6.67      13      1.50      1          1.39     
Fishery & farming                    5    1.29    0          0.00        1      0.12      0          0.00                        
Food processing                  20    5.17    3          6.67      25      2.88      1          1.39  
General machinery             41  10.59    4          8.89        0      0.00      0          0.00                            
Glass & ceramics                13    3.36    2          4.44        0      0.00      0          0.00  
Healthcare facilities                  0    0.00    0          0.00        9      1.04      0          0.00                             
Hotels/ motels                         0    0.00    0          0.00        7      0.81      2          2.78                     
Insurance                                2    0.52    0          0.00      69      7.94      5          6.95                             
Media                                       2    0.52    1          2.22        6      0.69      0          0.00                             
Non-apparel textiles               0    0.00    0          0.00        2      0.23      1          1.39                             
Non-ferrous metals             16    4.13    3          6.66        0      0.00      0          0.00 
Office equipment                      0    0.00    0          0.00        4      0.46      0          0.00                     
Oil & gas                0    0.00    0          0.00      58      7.94      5          6.95                             
Other products                    12    3.10    1          2.22        6      0.69      0          0.00 
Paper & paper products            0    0.00    0          0.00        9      1.04      1          1.39  
Personal & household products                 0    0.00    0          0.00      15      1.73      2          2.78                     
Personal services                     0    0.00    0          0.00        6      0.69      1          1.39                             
Pharmaceuticals                 18    4.65    1          2.22        8      0.92      1          1.39  
Printing & publishing             0    0.00    0          0.00       23     2.65      4          5.56                             
Railroads                                  0    0.00    0          0.00        6      0.69      1          1.39                          
Recreational products & services              0    0.00    0          0.00      14      1.61      2          2.78                            
Restaurants                 0    0.00    0          0.00      16      1.84      1          1.39                            
Retailing                                   0    0.00    0          0.00      82      9.48      6          8.34                            
Schools/ training                      0    0.00    0          0.00        9      1.04      1          1.39    
Scientific & technical instruments             0   0.00    0           0.00      14      1.61      4          5.56    
Transport equipment          25    6.46    2          4.44        0       0.00      0          0.00                            
Transportation services          8    2.07    0          0.00      11       1.27      2          2.78 
Unknown                              25    0.60  17        37.78        1       0.12      2          2.78                     
Totals                           289 100.00 45      100.00    628   100.00    72      100.00 
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Table 3 
Most of the members of this firm’s Board of Directors are “independent” – that is, they are 
not (nor have they been) employees of the firm, represent neither supplier nor customer 
firms, and have no relatives holding key managerial positions within the firm nor other fi-
nancial ties with it (other than shareholdings). 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample 77.78 12.50 4.17 1.39 
Japanese Sample -0- -0- 79.55 20.45 
χ2 = 100.44 
n = 116 








Few insiders serve on the Board of Directors of this company. 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample 62.50 22.22 2.78 5.56 
Japanese Sample -0- -0- 31.82 18.18 
χ2 = 79.94 
n = 116 








The only corporate officer who serves on the Board of Directors of this firm should be its Chief 
Executive Officer. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample 30.56 18.06 20.83 15.28 
Japanese Sample 13.89 8.34 30.55 27.77 
χ2 = 37.80 
n = 108 











No retired officers of this company should serve on its Board of Directors after their retire-
ments. 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample 26.76 19.72 22.54 11.27 
Japanese Sample -0- 18.18 50.00 2.27 
χ2 = 21.94 
n = 115 







Director “independence” ensures that this company’s Board of Directors will be constructively 
critical of managerial performance. 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample 36.62 46.48 2.82 4.23 
Japanese Sample 29.55 -0- 15.91 52.28 
χ2 = 64.85 
n = 115 







The Audit Committee of this company’s Board of Directors is “independent” – that is, none 
of the Audit Committee members are (nor have been) employees of the company, represent 
neither supplier nor customer firms, and have no relatives holding key managerial positions 
within the firm, nor other financial ties with it (other than shareholdings).  
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample 90.28 8.33 1.39 -0- 
Japanese Sample -0- -0- 43.18 56.82 
χ2 = 111.96 
n = 116 









All of the members of this firm’s Audit Committee are “financially literate” – that is, they 
fulfill the minimum regulatory requirements concerning the comprehension and use of finan-
cial statements. 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample 75.00 18.06 1.39 -0- 
Japanese Sample 2.27 9.09 43.18 43.18 
χ2 = 91.40 
n = 116 






The Audit Committee of this company hires and fires the independent auditing firm and rece-
ives its reports concerning the accuracy of performance data released by the company to in-
vestors. 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample 88.89 8.33 -0- -0- 
Japanese Sample 32.56 37.21 23.26 2.33 
χ2 = 43.01 
n = 115 






The Compensation Committee of this firm’s Board of Directors is  “independent” from the firm -
- that is, none of the Compensation Committee members are (nor have been) employees of the 
firm, represent neither supplier nor customer firms, and have no relatives holding key mana-
gerial positions within the firm, nor other financial ties with it (other than shareholdings). 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample 84.72 12.50 -0- 1.39 
Japanese Sample 6.82 11.36 36.36 36.36 
χ2 = 82.81 
n = 116 








The Compensation Committee of this firm determines the compensation package of the Chief 
Executive Officer and ratifies recommendations for the compensation packages of other top 
corporate officers. 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample 84.72 13.89 -0- -0- 
Japanese Sample 2.27 52.27 18.18 9.09 
χ2 = 78.44 
n = 116 






The Board of Directors of this company should not be actively involved in its day-to-day opera-
tions. 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample 57.75 33.80 4.23 1.41 
Japanese Sample 28.00 32.00 8.00 8.00 
χ2 = 16.32 
n = 96 







This firm’s Board of Directors primarily represents its shareholders’ interests and concerns by 
ensuring that the firm’s activities all create value. 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample 42.86 44.29 1.43 -0- 
Japanese Sample 2.33 20.93 30.23 20.93 
χ2 = 55.72 
n = 113 
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This firm’s performance is evaluated primarily through increases in its stock price and divi-
dend payments to investors. 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample 4.23 30.99 33.80 5.63 
Japanese Sample 14.29 66.67 -0- -0- 
χ2 = 27.97 
n = 113 









This firm’s investments in new lines of business are evaluated primarily on the basis of reve-
nue growth and payback. 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample 12.50 41.67 11.11 4.17 
Japanese Sample 2.27 27.27 31.82 2.27 
χ2 = 11.62 
n = 116 








This company’s future value is evaluated primarily in terms of revenue growth and outlook 
for industry-wide profit margins. 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample 5.63 50.70 16.90 4.23 
Japanese Sample 2.27 38.64 29.55 6.82 
χ2 = 3.91 
n = 115 






Governance of Japanese and U.S. Boards Compared 33
Table 18 
 
This firm’s attractiveness as an investment is evaluated primarily in terms its success at main-
taining stable employment. 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample 1.45 2.90 44.93 39.13 
Japanese Sample 19.05 14.29 14.29 38.10 
χ2 = 22.18 
n = 111 








This company’s Board of Directors divests under-performing lines of business that cannot be 
turned around successfully to meet its performance targets. 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample 14.08 29.58 18.31 1.41 
Japanese Sample 29.27 7.32 4.88 56.10 
χ2 = 61.44 
n = 112 








This firm will not get out of an unprofitable line of business until it has recovered its investment. 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample -0- 1.43 48.57 34.29 
Japanese Sample 2.33 23.26 18.60 4.65 
χ2 = 42.73 
n = 113 












This company will not get out of an unprofitable line of business if it holds a large market 
share in that market. 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample -0- 7.58 42.42 21.21 
Japanese Sample 2.27 47.73 18.18 6.82 
χ2 = 27.92 
n = 110 







This company will not get out of an unprofitable line of business if many employees will lose their 
jobs. 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
U.S. Sample -0- 2.99 43.28 38.81 
Japanese Sample 4.76 14.29 30.95 7.14 
χ2 = 26.27 
n = 109 
probability < .0001 
 
 
